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I. INTRODUCTION
On October 31, 1997, eleven-year-old Nathaniel Abraham was
at school and enjoying Halloween with his grade school classmates.
The festivities ended, however, when members of the Pontiac, Michi-
gan police department entered the classroom and arrested Nathaniel
for first degree murder. Two days before, on October 29, eighteen-
year-old Ronnie Lee Greene was walking out of a convenience store in
Pontiac when a .22 caliber bullet struck him in the head and killed
him.' Police suspected Nathaniel who, at the time of his arrest, had
1. See Randi Goldberg, 11-year-old Boy Ordered Tried as Adult in Sniper Slaying, DET.
NEWS, Nov. 15, 1997, at Al.
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over twenty encounters with law enforcement.2 Once in custody, Na-
thaniel eventually confessed to shooting Greene and signed a form
waiving both his right to remain silent and his right to have his attor-
ney present during questioning.3 Prior to trial, however, Family Court
Judge Eugene Arthur Moore barred the confession as inadmissible at
trial, finding that Nathanial was unable to understand the Miranda
rights as they were read to him." The court relied on psychological
evaluations that placed twelve-year-old Nathaniel's mental and emo-
tional level at that of a six or an eight year old.' On April 1, 1998, the
Michigan Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the confession was
in fact admissible in court.'
After the appellate court's decision, Nathaniel's trial proceeded
and received heavy coverage not only in Michigan but nationally as
well.7 During the trial, news cameras followed the 4'9", sixty-five
pound boy in and out of Michigan courtrooms.! In the fall of 1999, a
jury convicted Nathaniel Abraham of first degree murder, making him
one of the youngest people convicted of murder in the history of the
United States.' Amid the publicity stemming from the murder trial,
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See James A. McClear, Murder Confession Thrown Out: Judge Says Nathaniel Abra-
ham, 12, Wasn't Clear on Rights During Pontiac Investigation, DET. NEWS, May 8, 1998, at Cl.
5. See id. (" Tm satisfied he did not know the meaning of the statements [made to police
about the crime],' the judge declared, 'or understand the consequences of what he said.' ").
6. See Mike Martindale, Court Allows Boy's Statement: Ruling Strengthens Case Against
Accused Killer, Who was 11, DET. NEWS, Apr. 2, 1999, at C4. An emergency appeal to the Su-
preme Court was denied by Justice John Paul Stevens. See Mark Truby, High Court Deals Boy
Setback: Statements He Made to Police After Arrest can be Used in Youngest Murder Suspect's
Trial, DET. NEWS, Oct. 1, 1999, at C4.
7. Geoffrey Fieiger, the recent Democratic nominee for Governor of Michigan and nation-
ally-known defense attorney for clients such as Dr. Jack Kevorkian, joined Nathaniel's defense
team at trial. See Oralandar Brand-Williams & Mark Truby, Feiger Bursts in to Teen's Defense:
Controversial Attorney could Change Course of 13-year-old's Murder Trial Experts Say, DET.
NEWS, Oct. 20, 1999, at Al. Geraldo, Good Morning America, 20-20, Court TV and newspapers in
Singapore and France covered the case. See Ron French & Kim Kozlowski, Does Nate Under-
stand Plight?: While a Courtroom Full of Lawyers Debate, Accused Teen asks, "When do I Get to
go Home?", DET. NEWS, Oct. 22, 1999, at Al. Ed Bradley interviewed him on 60 Minutes. See Tim
Kiska et al., The System Failed Him, DET. NEWS, Nov. 5, 1999, at Al. Bradley later commented
on his impression of Nathaniel Abraham, "'I was left with the fact that he's still a kid. He's 13
years old. And not a very mature 13-year-old.'" See id.
8. See French & Kozlowski, supra note 7, at Al.
9. See Jury Finds Abraham Guilty of Second-Degree Murder, DET. NEWS, Nov. 16, 1999, at
Cl. The recent killing of six-year-old Kayla Rolland by a first grade classmate could have broken
this dubious record. See Peter Slevin & William Claiborne, 1st-Grader Shoots Classmate to
Death, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 2000, at Al. Authorities, however, did not charge the six-year-old
shooter, but rather charged the owner of the gun with manslaughter. See William Claiborne,
Man Charged in Schoolgirl's Slaying, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 2000, at A3. The Kayla Rolland kill-
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jurists, attorneys and commentators have begun to re-examine the
juvenile criminal law system and the constitutional rights afforded
juveniles in that system.
One of the constitutional rights afforded juveniles and adults
alike is the Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-
incrimination.' The constitutional protections afforded citizens in cus-
todial interrogations were described by the Supreme Court in the
landmark case of Miranda v. Arizona." One year later, the Court held
in In re Gault that juveniles are entitled to the same constitutional
protections as adults in custodial interrogations.' The Court's decision
in Gault followed decisions in Haley v. Ohio3 and Gallegos v.
Colorado' in which the Court recognized that juveniles in custody
need at least the same constitutional protections that adults enjoy and
possibly more.
The Court deviated from this trend of evaluating juvenile con-
stitutional rights with a view towards enhanced Fifth Amendment
protection in Fare v. Michael C.'5 In Fare, the Court held that a juve-
nile's request to see his probation officer was not necessarily an invo-
cation of his Fifth Amendment rights under Miranda and that the
voluntariness of a juvenile's confession must be evaluated using a "to-
tality of the circumstances" test." A problematic side effect of the test
is that court officials and police officers who are often untrained in
even basic psychology must engage in a psychological evaluation of the
ing is only the latest example of violent action taken by juveniles, much of which ends in crimi-
nal prosecution. See id.
10. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
11. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966) (holding that a person in police custody
"must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be
used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to ... an attorney, either retained or ap-
pointed" in order to counteract the inherently coercive environment of the stationhouse). A cus-
todial interrogation is the questioning of a defendant that takes place while the defendant is in
police custody. See id. at 444.
12. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967) ("[IN]either the Fourteenth Amendment, nor the Bill of
Rights is for adults alone.').
13. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 597-98, 601 (1948) (holding that a juvenile's confession was
inadmissible because the juvenile did not have access to anyone during his interrogation which
lasted for five hours, and there was some evidence the child had been physically abused).
14. Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54 (1962) (holding that, because a juvenile did not
have any access to an adult, he did not understand his rights, and his confession was therefore
obtained involuntarily).
15. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979) (holding that the voluntariness of a juvenile
confession needs to be evaluated by a "totality-of-the-circumstances" test).
16. Id. at 727-28. The "totality of the circumstances" test "includes an evaluation of the ju-
venile's age, experience, education, background, and intelligence and into whether he has the
capacity to understand the warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and
the consequences of waiving those rights." Id. at 725.
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juvenile to fufill the ends of the test.'" Fare muddied the constitu-
tional waters for juveniles in custody and for law-enforcement offi-
cials. The "totality of the circumstances" test the Court urged in Fare
was intentionally subjective'8 and leaves the various states to come up
with their own formulations of the rule.
As one would expect, the way states have dealt with the consti-
tutional mandates handed down by the Supreme Court has varied
widely.'9 On one end of the spectrum are states that have decided that
a juvenile's rights against compelled self-incrimination can be pro-
tected only by the presence of an "interested adult!'.'
In the middle of the spectrum are those states which follow
Fare, but also address Miranda's concern that the juvenile be effec-
tively apprised of his rights.' Courts in these states have ruled that
the absence of a parent or guardian during a custodial interrogation
can in some circumstances render a confession involuntary and inad-
missible.'
17. Obviously, practicality demands that someone make a decision about these matters.
This Note argues that police and courts should turn to the most immediately qualified person to
make such decisions: the parents or guardian of a juvenile.
18. Fare, 442 U.S. at 725; see also supra note 16.
19. Compare In re E.T.C., Juvenile, 449 A.2d 937, 940 (Vt. 1982) (holding that a juvenile's
confession taken in the absence of his parent was involuntary and therefore should be sup-
pressed as violative of the Fifth Amendment), with Commonwealth v. Williams, 475 A.2d 1283,
1288 (Pa. 1985) (holding that a juvenile's confession made in the absence of his parent was vol-
untary in the totality of the circumstances).
20. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 449 N.E.2d 654, 657 (Mass. 1983) (holding that,
in order for the Commonwealth to prove a juvenile voluntarily and knowingly waived his rights
against compelled self-incrimination, a parent or interested adult must be present); State v.
Fincher, 305 S.E.2d 685, 692 (N.C. 1983) (holding that the defendant did not knowingly waive
his self-incrimination rights because he was not informed he had a right for a parent or guardian
to be present); E.T.C., 449 A.2d at 940 (holding that a juvenile cannot waive his rights against
compelled self-incrimination without the presence of an interested adult). An "interested adult"
has been defined as "an informed parent, or person standing in loco parentis." A Juvenile, 449
N.E.2d at 657.
21. See, e.g., In re LaShun H. 672 N.E.2d 331, 339 (.l1. App. Ct. 1996) (holding that, in the
totality of the circumstances, the absence of a juvenile suspect's parents rendered the juvenile's
confession involuntary); People v. Smith, 630 N.E.2d 1068, 1084 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (holding that
the absence of juvenile's parent during his confession did not make his statement involuntary
and thus inadmissible). For a fuller discussion of these cases, see infra note 22.
22. See LaShun H. 672 N.E.2d at 339. The Illinois appellate court's holding in In re
LaShun H.-that a juvenile's confession was involuntary because of the absence of his parent-
was a rare finding of involuntariness in a state that applies the Fare test. Id. at 339. Research
yields only a few of these kinds of cases. The rarity of this finding is instructive in that it shows
how the Fare test, intended to provide judges more flexibility in considering juvenile confessions,
has been applied rigidly and allows juvenile confessions in all but the rarest of circumstances. An
unfortunate side effect coming from those states, however, is that different defendants in similar
circumstances have had their confessions ruled voluntary and admissible. This could result in
one's Fifth Amendment rights being affected largely by the jurisdiction within which one was
arrested. See Smith, 630 N.E.2d at 1084. The People v. Smith case was decided in the First Dis-
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Finally, in the majority of states in which Fare's totality of the
circumstances analysis is applied, a juvenile defendant will almost
always lose any subsequent motion to suppress a confession based on
the absence of a parent or guardian.' In these states, the kinds of
facts that would result in a holding of involuntariness would be so
egregious that it stretches the imagination to think they could ever
possibly occur. For example, it is likely these states would suppress a
confession obtained by police brutality.' Consequently, juveniles are
often interrogated without a parent or guardian present, and even the
youngest defendants have been held to have "voluntarily" waived the
constitutional rights.'
This Note recommends a new approach towards juvenile custo-
dial interrogations that would resolve the problems inherent in the
application of current constitutional mandates and allow police offi-
cers, judges and attorneys to mark their behavior consistent with the
Constitution. More importantly, it would secure a greater protection
for juvenile constitutional rights in custodial interrogations. In cases
where a juvenile is arrested on suspicion of a felony, the police should
inform the child, in addition to the Miranda warnings mandated by
Gault, that he has the right to have a parent or guardian with him
during questioning. The police should then not interrogate that juve-
nile until the juvenile's parent, guardian or legal counsel is present
with the juvenile in the interrogation room. Any confession obtained
in contravention of these procedures would be inadmissible at trial.
Part II of this Note will discuss the constitutional framework of
juvenile constitutional rights in custodial interrogation settings.
Part Ill of this Note will then describe how individual states have ap-
trict of the Sixth Division of the Appellate Court of Blinois. Id. at 1068. The LaShun H. case was
decided in the First District of the Fifth Division of the Appellate Court of Illinois. LaShun, 672
N.E.2d at 331.
23. See, e.g., State v. Scholtz, 791 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990); People v. Bonnie
H., 56 Cal. App. 4th 563, 577-79 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997); W.M. v. State, 585 So. 2d 979, 983 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1991); People v. Givans, 575 N.W.2d 84, 89 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997); State v. Jones,
566 N.W.2d 317, 325-26 (Minn. 1997); Commonwealth v. Williams, 475 A.2d 1283, 1288 (Pa.
1984).
24. See In re N.L., 711 A.2d 518, 519, 523 (Pa. 1998) (holding that a juvenile defendant who
initially invoked his right to silence and then spoke to police on immediate re-questioning could
not suppress his statement to police). In In re N.L. a fourteen year old initially told police that he
wished to remain silent. Id. at 519. After a few minutes he was asked if he wanted to talk and
said that he did and confessed. See id. His confession led to his conviction on sexual assault
charges. See id. However, at least one court has held that the totality test would not necessarily
mandate suppression of the confession of a juvenile who initially invoked his Miranda rights but
confessed on re-questioning after a short interval.
25. See W.M., 585 So. 2d at 983 (holding that a ten year old's confession was voluntarily
given, in the totality of the circumstances, even in the absence of the juvenile's parent or guard-
ian).
2000] 1359
VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW
plied the Supreme Court's opinions concerning juvenile constitutional
rights during police interrogation. In Part IV, this Note will discuss a
proposal that would more fully effectuate the Supreme Court's deci-
sions regarding juvenile constitutional rights by requiring an adult's
certification that a child's decision to speak with police is voluntary.
In conclusion, this Note recognizes that more and more juve-
niles like Nathaniel Abraham are being charged with increasingly
publicized and horrific crimes like murder and rape. -6 In light of this
increased volume of juvenile felony cases, this Note argues that consti-
tutional safeguards must be tailored to the specific characteristics of
children in order to ensure that their constitutional rights are pro-
tected at the same level as adults.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
To understand the necessity for the presence of a parent or
guardian during juvenile questioning, one must understand how vari-
ous states have grappled with the problem. While the Supreme Court
has rarely spoken regarding the rights of juveniles in custody, the
holdings of the Court provide a starting point for an examination of
juvenile constitutional rights.27 First, the Court acted to curtail abuses
in all custodial interrogations, not simply those of juveniles, with its
landmark decision in Miranda v. Arizona."3 Second, the Court has rec-
ognized that juveniles in custody need more protection than do
26. In 1997, law enforcement agencies made an estimated 2.8 million juvenile arrests. See
Howard Synder, Estimated Number of Juvenile Arrests, 1997, OJJDP STATISTICAL BRIEFING
BOOK (visited Jan. 6, 2000), <http://ojjdp.ncjrs.orglojstabb/qaOOl.html>. Of those arrests, over
123,000 were for murder, non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, or aggravated
assault. See id. Of all the juvenile arrests for violent crimes, an estimated 30% of those juveniles
arrested were under the age of fifteen. See id. The number of juvenile arrests for violent crimes
increased around 49% from 1988 to 1997. See id. Overall, nine out of ten juvenile convictions in
criminal court were for felony charges. See id. at 5. The number of juveniles charged with mur-
der grew every year from 1984 to 1994 before declining slightly in 1995. See Howard Synder,
Murders Known to Involve Juvenile Offenders, 1980-1995, OJJDP STATISTICAL BRIEFING BOOK
(visited Jan. 6, 2000) <http://www.ncjrs.org/ojjdplojstatbb/qa051>. Some 823 juveniles were
charged with murder in 1984. See id. That number rose as high as 2,317 in 1994 before receding
to 1,932 in 1995. See id.
27. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967) (noting that the Bill of Rights applies to juveniles);
Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 50, 53 (1962) (noting that the young age of the petitioner weighs
into considerations of the voluntariness of his confession); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599-600
(1948) (holding that a juvenile deserves at least as much constitutional protection in police inter-
rogations as an adult).
28. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (holding that warnings must be given to
suspects to prevent police overarching in questioning).
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adults." Finally, the Court slowed its expansion of the protections laid
out in Miranda and juvenile decisions prior to Miranda. In Fare v.
Michael C. the Court held that a juvenile's invocation of their Fifth
Amendment rights could not be made by simply asking for a parent
for such a rule would make invocation too easy.'
A. Before Miranda: Protecting the '_ad of Tender Years"
1. Haley v. Ohio
Around midnight on October 19, 1945, fifteen-year-old John
Harvey Haley was awakened from his bed and brought to the Canton,
Ohio police station for questioning about a robbery and murder. 1 Po-
lice questioned Haley for five straight hours that night, and he signed
a confession around 6:30 A.M. 2 He was then held incommunicado for
three days and neither his attorney nor his mother was allowed to see
him.
33
Haley's case gave the Supreme Court its first chance to evalu-
ate the conduct of the police during custodial interrogations of juve-
niles. The Court reacted against the heavy-handed methods used to
extract Haley's confession. ' Specifically, the Court cited Haley's age,
the number of hours that he was "grilled," the intensity of his ques-
tioning and the fact that he had "no friend or counsel to advise him."35
The Court also noted the "callous attitude of the police towards [Ha-
ley's] rights."' The Court was convinced that "this was a confession
29. See Gallegos, 370 U.S. at 54 ("[The teenage suspect] cannot be compared with an adult
in full possession of his senses and knowledgeable of the consequences of his admissions.'); Ha-
ley, 332 U.S. at 599-600 ("We cannot believe that a lad of tender years is a match for the police in
such a contest [as custodial interrogation].').
30. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 723 (1979) (holding that the Miranda per se rule
should not be expanded due to the risk of making the standard too broad and too easily applied).
The Fare Court refers to the Miranda per se rule: that a request for an attorney will be treated
as a per se invocation of one's Fifth Amendment rights will have the same constitutional force as
an assertion of one's right to silence. Id.
31. See Haley, 332 U.S. at 597.
32. See id. at 598.
33. See id. Haley was not totally without visitors. A newspaper photographer was allowed
into the stationhouse to take his picture shortly after his confession-five days before his mother
would be allowed to see him. See id. When Haley's mother finally saw him, he was bruised and
skinned in several places. See id. at 597.
34. See id. at 601. Justice William 0. Douglas wrote for the Court in Haley, as he would in
Gallegos v. Colorado, a later case concerning juvenile custodial interrogation. Gallegos, 370 U.S.
at 49.
35. Haley, 332 U.S. at 600-01.
36. Id.
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wrung from a child by means which the law should not sanction.37
Fundamental for the purpose of this Note was the Court's recognition
that Haley should have received different treatment because of his
young age and because he was, as the Court put it, "an easy victim of
the law."38
The majority first cited the obvious differences between the
maturity of a grown adult and that of a juvenile, noting that "[a]ge 15
is a tender and difficult age for any boy of any race. He cannot be
judged by more exacting standards of maturity."39 The majority then
noted that juveniles, because of their age and immaturity, are more
easily manipulated by authority figures and, thus, more likely to con-
fess."0 The Court questioned whether juveniles, facing the questions of
police alone in the intimidating confines of the stationhouse, could
ever hope to be a fair match for the officers they faced."' The majority
found that the sheer weight of the state's investigatory power, when
placed squarely on the chest of a fifteen-year-old boy, required that
someone be with the boy to help bear that burden."
The opinion in Haley makes much of the fact that no adult
friend or counselor was with young Haley during his questioning. 3
The Court also questioned how the police could claim that their inter-
rogation was "conducted in a fair and dispassionate manner" when "[a]
photographer was admitted [to see Haley] at once; but his closest
friend-his mother-was not allowed to see him for over five days af-
ter his arrest."" That the majority focused so prominently on the ab-
sence of Haley's mother from his interrogation indicates that the
Court believed that John Haley needed more than legal counsel in or-
der to have the benefit of his full constitutional rights." The lack of
additional support from someone other than legal counsel, coupled
with the exposure of a "lad of tender years" to intense police ques-
37. Id. at 601.
38. Id. at 599 ("What transpired would make us pause for careful inquiry if a mature man
were involved. And when, as here, a mere child-an easy victim of the law-is before us, special
care in scrutinizing the record must be used.').
39. Id.
40. See id. ("A 15 year old lad, questioned through the dead of night by relays of police, is a
ready victim of the inquisition.')
41. See id. at 599-600. ("We cannot believe that a lad of tender years is a match for the po-
lice in such a contest.').
42. See id. at 600. ("[The juvenile in custody] needs counsel and support if he is not to be-
come the victim first of fear, then of panic.").
43. Id. ("No friend stood at the side of this 15-year old boy .... No lawyer stood
guard....').
44. Id.
45. See id.
1362 [Vol. 53:1355
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tioning, was a major factor in leading the Court to overturn Haley's
conviction and throw out his confession."
2. Gallegos v. Colorado
Nearly fifteen years later, the Supreme Court revisited the
subject of juvenile custodial interrogations in Gallegos v. Colorado."'
The facts in Gallegos were similar to those in Haley; 8 police arrested
the fourteen-year-old petitioner on suspicion of robbery and assault
and held him for five days."' During this time, he was not allowed to
see a lawyer, parent or other interested adult before he signed a con-
fession.' The Gallegos Court51 recognized the similarity to the Haley
case, yet the majority conceded that there were differences between
the two cases; in Haley" the detention was shorter and there was no
evidence of physical abuse of the suspect.' The Court's reasoning and
analysis in Gallegos also differed from that in Haley; the Gallegos
Court developed a "totality of the circumstances" test for determining
the validity of a juvenile's waiver of the Fifth Amendment.' On the
facts of the case, however, the Court found that the circumstances
surrounding Gallegos' interrogation necessarily barred his confession
and the Court reversed his convictions.'
46. Id. at 599-601. The Court noted that the juvenile in custody "needs someone on whom to
lean lest the overpowering presence of the law, as he knows it, may not crush him." Id. at 600
(emphasis added).
47. Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54 (1962) (holding that a juvenile needs some kind of
adult protection while being interrogated).
48. For a discussion of Haley's incarceration and interrogation, see supra notes 31-33 and
accompanying text.
49. See Gallegos, 370 U.S. at 50.
50. See id. The victim of Gallegos' alleged assault later died from his injuries and Gallegos
was charged by information with first degree murder. See id. As in Haley, the juvenile's mother
attempted to see her son but was denied by the police. See id.; see also supra note 33.
51. The majority opinion in Gallegos was written by Justice Douglas-the same justice who
wrote the decision in Haley. Gallegos, 370 U.S. at 49.
52. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 596 (1948).
53. See id. at 597-98.
54. Gallegos, 370 U.S. at 55. See also infra note 55 (describing the Gallegos totality test).
55. See Gallegos, 370 U.S. at 55. Interestingly, the Gallegos Court's description of the "to-
tality of the circumstances" test did not at all resemble the test later laid down by Fare. While
the Gallegos test focused on the conduct of the police, the Fare test focuses on the comprehension
of the juvenile. Compare Gallegos, 370 U.S. at 55 ('There is no guide to the decision of cases such
as this, except the totality of circumstances that bear on the two factors we have mentioned. The
youth of the petitioner, the long detention, the failure to send for his parents, the failure imme-
diately to bring him before the judge of the Juvenile Court, the failure to see to it that he had the
advice of a lawyer or friend-all these combine to make us conclude that the formal confession on
which this conviction may have rested was obtained in violation of due process.") (emphasis
added), with Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979) ("[The totality of the circumstances
test] includes evaluation of the juvenile's age, experience, education, background, and intelli-
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On the other hand, the Court identified what made the cases so
similar; during Gallegos's detention, his mother attempted to see him
and was denied access by the police.' Nor was Gallegos allowed to see
any "lawyer or adult advisor" during his custodial interrogation. ' The
absence of a "lawyer or adult advisor," the Court stated, gave "the case
an ominous cast."' If the Court had simply been worried about Galle-
gos's lack of counsel it could have simply couched its discussion in
those terms. But Gallegos is not simply a "right to counsel" case; the
Court's focus was on the fact that Gallegos, a fourteen year-old boy,
was alone during his interrogation on serious charges.5' A juvenile's
lack of intellectual ability to weather police questioning without addi-
tional support-which the Court indicated could have come from an
"adult advisor" as well as a lawyer-was a crucial point in the Galle-
gos case.'
In Gallegos, the majority reiterated the fundamental point it
made in Haley-that a juvenile's ability to cope with the custodial en-
vironment is necessarily limited by the juvenile's immaturity.6 ' But
the Gallegos Court made the point with more force. The majority held
that a juvenile cannot possibly be compared with an average adult in
his ability to comprehend his surroundings and the consequences of
his actions. 2 Because of this, the majority reasoned that "without the
aid of more mature judgment" as to what the juvenile should do, he
will be hopelessly coerced by the nature of his environment.'
The Gallegos Court also noted that it was constitutionally ir-
relevant that Gallegos had not asked for a lawyer or for his parents, a
position that the prosecution apparently stressed before the Court.'
The Court recognized that a juvenile in custody might have difficulty
gence, and into whether he has the capacity to understand the warnings given him, the nature of
his Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights.").
56. See Gallegos, 370 U.S. at 50 (describing the circumstances of Gallegos's time in custody).
57. Id. at 54.
58. Id.
59. Id. ("Adult advice would have put him on a less unequal footing with his interrogator
.... "). The Court does not say 'legal counsel" or "an attorney" would have placed the boy on a
more equal footing with police but rather the Court says that any adult advice would have
helped. See id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. (emphasis added).
64. Gallegos, 370 U.S. at 54 ('The prosecution says the boy was advised of his right to coun-
sel, but that he did not ask either for a lawyer or for his parents. But a 14 year old boy, no matter
how sophisticated, is unlikely to have any conception of what will confront him when he is made
accessible only to the police.").
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articulating his concerns or fears to a lawyer.' The juvenile's youth
and immaturity, the Court feared, would thus render him helpless to
assert his rights.' But placing a parent or guardian with the juvenile
during this interrogation-an idea supported by both the Haley67 and
Gallegos' Courts-compensates for the juvenile's inability to ade-
quately assert his constitutional rights." The majority focused on the
presence of an interested adult as an appropriate addition to other
protections as a cure to abuses in juvenile interrogation."
B. Miranda and Gault: Protections For Those in Custody,
Including Juveniles
1. Miranda v. Arizona
The Supreme Court took up the constitutional questions re-
garding custodial interrogations for adults in Miranda v. Arizona."'
The Court offered examples of subtle and non-violent police interroga-
tion tactics designed to overpower a suspect's will and induce confes-
sions which violated a suspect's Fifth Amendment rights.' The major-
ity focused almost entirely on the inherently coercive atmosphere of
the stationhouse and the police tactics of interrogation as its basis for
creating a series of safeguards to prevent involuntary confessions. 3
The Court offered as a remedy for coercive nature of the custodial en-
vironment a requirement that police inform suspects of their constitu-
65. See id. ("That is to say, we deal with a person who is not equal to the police in knowl-
edge and understanding of the consequences of the questions and answers being recorded and is
unable to know how to protect his own interests or how to get the benefits of his constitutional
rights.").
66. See id.
67. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 600 (1948) (holding that the absence of the boys mother
was a large factor in ruling his confession was not voluntary).
68. Gallegos, 370 U.S. at 54 ("Adult advice would have put him on a less unequal footing
with his interrogators").
69. For a discussion regarding the Court's statements on the necessity of adult advice in a
custodial interrogation setting, see infra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
70. See Gallegos, 370 U.S. at 54 ("[A]n adult relative or friend could have given the peti-
tioner the protection which his own immaturity could not .... Without some adult protection
against this inequality, a 14 year old boy would not be able to know, let alone assert, such consti-
tutional rights as he had.").
71. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (holding that a suspect in custody must be
advised of their rights before police interrogation).
72. See id. at 448-50 (outlining police procedures for interrogation that include putting the
suspect in unfamiliar confines, displaying confidence in the suspect's guilt and minimizing the
moral seriousness of the offense).
73. See id. at 456 ("[W]e concern ourselves primarily with this interrogation atmosphere
and the evils it can bring.").
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tional rights with regard to the interrogation. 4 If the police apprised
the suspects of their constitutional rights, the Court reasoned, the co-
ercive nature of the interrogation itself would be lessened."
' The Court made clear that the pressures of interrogation were
combated only if the accused was "adequately and effectively apprised
of his rights."76 The majority, however, did not clarify the extent to
which the accused had to be "adequately and effectively" apprised in
order to satisfy constitutional requirements." The Court seemingly
wanted to convey to police officers that it was not enough merely to
read a suspect his rights; rather, the suspect had to understand those
rights in order to give them force. 8 The Court pointed out that in order
to ensure that the suspect understood the rights as read to him, a po-
lice officer might have to more fully explain their meaning. Though
the majority stressed that the warnings had to be understood by the
accused, the Court ultimately based its decision on one fundamental
assumption-that in informing the suspect of his rights, the suspect
will understand his rights and assert or waive them voluntarily.' Yet
the majority did not contemplate the use of the warnings-or their
near lack of usefulness-in a situation where the accused is unable to
understand them due to a lack of maturity or sufficient cognitive de-
velopment."
The majority in Miranda, however, left the door open to meth-
ods that would expand upon its decision and allow for suspects in cus-
tody to receive more comprehensive information regarding their con-
74. See id. at 444. The warnings police must give include the suspect's right to remain si-
lent, that any evidence given can be used against the suspect, and that the suspect has a right to
counsel being present with him during questioning. See id.
75. See id. at 469 ("[A] warning at the time of interrogation is indispensable to overcome its
pressures and insure that the individual knows he is free to exercise the privilege at that point in
time.').
76. Id. at 467.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See id. at 473.
80. See id. at 468-69 ('CThe Fifth Amendment privilege is so fundamental to our system of
constitutional rule and the expedient of giving an adequate warning as to the availability of the
privilege so simple, we will not pause to inquire in individual cases whether the defendant was
aware of his rights without a warning being given. Assessments of the knowledge the defendant
possessed, based on information as to his age, education, intelligence or prior contact with
authorities, can never be more than speculation; a warning is a clearcut fact.') Consider, how-
ever, the "totality of circumstances" test offered by the Fare court that is concerned entirely with
the "speculation" cautioned against by this passage. See supra note 16 (outlining the "totality of
the circumstances" test in Fare).
81. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468-69; see also infra note 82 (discussing the absence of this
idea).
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stitutional rights.' The Miranda Court intimated that the decision
should be a starting point in informing suspects of their constitutional
rights and not a guarantee of those rights themselves.' Any policy de-
signed to ensure juvenile understanding would be consistent with
Miranda.
2. Miranda's Application to Adults with Mental Incapacity
The way in which some courts have evaluated a Miranda
waiver when an adult defendant has a mental defect or is of subordi-
nate intelligence provides an example of how courts ascribe more pro-
tection to adults with insufficient cognitive development to intelli-
gently waive their Miranda rights.' Adults with a mental defect or
subnormal intelligence are similar to juveniles from a legal standpoint
because of their limited cognitive ability.' As such, how courts treat
these individuals provides a helpful model for analyzing juvenile
Miranda rights. Several courts have indicated that when a person's
cognitive ability is low, the corresponding constitutional protections
should be high.'
82. Id. at 478-79 ("Procedural safeguards must be employed to protect the privilege and
unless other fully effective means are adopted to notify the person of his right of silence and to
assure that the exercise of the right will be scrupulously honored, the following measures are
required!). The Court is currently considering whether other means that have been adopted by
Congress would better effectuate the Constitution's purpose on this issue. See Dickerson v.
United States, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999) cert. granted 120 S. Ct. 578 (1999). In Dickerson v.
United States--on which the Court heard oral arguments in early December, 1999-the Court
considered a federal statute passed shortly after Miranda which would make all confessions
voluntary, with or without warnings, unless the defendant could show that he was coerced by the
government. Id. If the Court affirms the Fourth Circuit, the resulting effect on juvenile law is
unclear. Since it is a federal law under consideration, presumably the decision would affect only
those arrested by federal officers. Since most juvenile offenders are arrested at the state level,
this would have little effect on them; and this proposal articulated in this Note would remain a
viable option. If the Court was to interpret Dickerson more widely, and freed the states from the
Miranda ruling, the likelihood of juvenile self-incrimination would increase. In any event, the
Court's ruling in Dickerson would affect the overall constitutional framework of juvenile rights.
83. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478-79 (noting that any subsequent proposal regarding the warn-
ings needs to at least encompass the basic constitutional protections outlined by the Miranda
decision).
84. See Charles C. Marvel, Annotation, Mental Subnormality of Accused as Affecting Volun-
tariness or Admissibility of Confession, 8 A.L.R.4th 16, 24-25 (1981).
85. See id. at 28. This is not to say, however, that juvenile cognition is the same as the cog-
nition of the mentally retarded, for example. The point of this analysis is not to compare juvenile
cognition to cognition of those with subnormal intelligence from a medical or psychological per-
spective. Rather, for the purposes of this Note, it is the legal treatment of these individuals and
how courts approach the Miranda guarantees with respect to these individuals that is instruc-
tive.
86. See, e.g. Smith v. Zant, 855 F.2d 712, 719 (11th Cir. 1988) rev'd on other grounds, 887
F.2d 1407, 1418 (11th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (holding that a defendant with a definite mental de-
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The Supreme Court has held that an evaluation of the validity
of a waiver of one's Fifth Amendment protections has "two distinct
dimensions."87 The first dimension of a proper waiver is that the
waiver must be voluntary and free from police intimidation or coer-
cion.' The Court expanded on this first dimension of a proper waiver
in Colorado v. Connelly.' In Connelly, the Court held that mental ill-
ness (specifically "hearing voices") could not serve as a compulsion
that would invalidate Miranda waiver free of police instigated coer-
cion.'
The second dimension of a proper waiver is that the waiver
must be intelligently made with a full knowledge of the consequences
of the waiver.9 The Supreme Court has not expanded on this aspect of
the analysis other than to acknowledge that it exists. 2
Several lower courts have followed the Supreme Court's lead
and held that a Miranda waiver is invalid if the defendant is mentally
retarded or has below average intelligence. 3 In doing so, lower courts
have reasoned that these defendants need more protection than the
average defendant because of their limited mental ability.94 In Smith
v. Zant, for example, the Eleventh Circuit found that a defendant was
mentally retarded and that his mental defect prevented him from
making a knowing and intelligent Miranda waiver.9 The Smith case
fect-mental retardation-could not make an intelligent Miranda waiver and, as such, deserved
more protection from police coercion).
87. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (describing that a valid waiver must be, first, vol-
untary and, second, made intelligently with full awareness of the consequences of waiver).
88. See id. ("First the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense
that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion or de-
ception.. .. ).
89. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986) (holding that a "voice of God" telling
Connelly to confess was not a compulsion that overwhelmed his ability to voluntarily confess to
murder).
90. Id. (holding that Connelly's confession was voluntary because the police did not actively
coerce him into confession and that his only coercion was the voice he heard in his head).
91. See Moran, 475 U.S. at 421 ("Second, the waiver must have been made with a full
awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision
to abandon it.').
92. See, e.g., Connelly, 479 U.S. at 170-71 (focusing on the fact that Connelly's confession
was voluntary rather than whether his waiver was intelligently made).
93. See United States v. Moses, 137 F.3d 894, 902 (6th Cir. 1998) (questioning the compe-
tence of a defendant to make and understand the nature of his confession based in part on his
extremely low intelligence); United States v. Hull, 441 F.2d 308, 312 (7th Cir. 1971) (holding the
waiver of a thirty-four year-old man with an I.Q. of 54 and the mental age of an eight or nine
year old to be invalid).
94. See, e.g. Moses, 137 F.3d at 902 (describing how defendant's extremely low intelligence
cast doubts on the state's claim that his constitutional waiver was valid).
95. Smith v. Zant, 855 F.2d 712, 719 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that Smith's mental retarda-
tion prevented him from making an intelligent Miranda waiver).
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and other lower court cases thus provide a basis for reasoning that,
where the defendant has subnormal cognitive ability, the defendant is
given more protection and his waiver is more closely scrutinized This
treatment is analogous to juveniles who, though they do not have cog-
nitive limitations due to mental defect, have cognitive limitations due
to lack of maturity and their young age."'
In addition to mental retardation and low intelligence as fac-
tors that invalidate a Miranda waiver, one court has found that low
mental capacity coupled with limited English skills can be grounds to
find a Miranda waiver to be invalid. 8 In United States v. Garibay, the
Ninth Circuit held that Garibay's low intelligence as well as his in-
ability to understand spoken English made him unable to intelligently
waive his Fifth Amendment rights." The Garibay case is important for
an analysis of juvenile constitutional rights because the issue in that
case was that the defendant did not understand his rights when read
to him' ---in the same way a juvenile might be unable to understand
his rights when read to him.1"' In Garibay, the court gave more protec-
tion to a defendant who was unable to understand his rights which
gives credence to this Note's theory that those with cognitive limita-
tions, juveniles in this instance, deserve greater constitutional protec-
tion.'"
The cases in this area are instructive when evaluating a juve-
nile's ability to intelligently and knowingly waive his or her Miranda
rights. The fact that courts have applied a stronger degree of Miranda
protection to adults proven to have lower than normal cognitive ability
suggests that courts evaluating juvenile custodial interrogations
might use analogous reasoning; juveniles, who by virtue of their age
are not as developed cognitively than normal adults, deserve more
stringent protection of their Miranda rights.
In addition to an analogy with adult Miranda rights in the con-
text where an adult defendant lacks normal cognitive abilities, the
Supreme Court has also addressed the way in which Miranda applies
specifically to juveniles.
96. Id.
97. See generally DAVID WOOD, How CHILDREN THINK AND LEARN (1989).
98. See United States v. Garibay, 143 F.3d 534, 539 (9th Cir. 1998) ("the facts surrounding
Garibay's interrogation clearly indicated that he did not understand the nature of the rights he
was waiving').
99. Id. ("[W]e conclude the district court erred in finding that despite Garibay's low IQ and
poor English-verbal comprehension, he nonetheless functioned at a level sufficient to have un-
derstood and waived the constitutional rights.').
100. Id.
101. See infra note 181 and accompanying text.
102. Garibay, 143 F.3d at 154.
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3. Miranda's Application to Juveniles
One year after Miranda, the Court addressed its application to
the juvenile justice system."3 In In re Gault, the Court held that the
juvenile justice system, despite its less formal and less adversarial
nature, was still bound by the requirements of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments.'
The Gault Court found that "authoritative opinion has cast
formidable doubt on the reliability and trustworthiness of 'confessions'
by children" made without the presence of an interested adult."5 The
Court recognized that children and adults often faced similar penal-
ties and that commitment to a children's state institution was similar,
in effect, to incarceration in an adult prison." In light of these facts,
the majority concluded that juveniles are entitled to the constitutional
protections outlined in Miranda.' The Court noted that the Miranda
warnings were a basic guarantee for juveniles in custody and inti-
mated that juveniles, because of their age and relative inexperience,
would likely need even more than the base level Miranda warnings to
fully effectuate their constitutional rights.0 8
In addition to securing for juveniles the right to be informed of
their constitutional rights under the Fifth Amendment, the Gault
Court recognized that juveniles might require a higher degree of pro-
tection during custodial interrogations.'" While the Gault decision
tracks Miranda by focusing on the presence or absence of counsel in
determining a Fifth Amendment waiver, the Court illustrates that the
presence of a juvenile's parents-while decidedly not a substitute for
counsel-can guarantee that the child is voluntarily participating in a
police questioning. The Court noted that special techniques may be
103. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967) (holding that privilege against self-incrimination
is applicable in the juvenile system).
104. Id. at 13 ("[N]either the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults
alone.").
105. Id. at 52. The Court cited an opinion from the New York Court of Appeals in which two
boys confessed to assault and rape and a psychiatrist testified that one of the boys "would admit
'whatever he thought was expected so that he could get out of the immediate situation.' " Id.
106. See id. at 49-50 (discussing how juveniles may not even get assurances they will not be
placed in prison with adult criminals).
107. See id. at 47 (holding that juveniles deserved, at least, the same protections as adults in
the context of juvenile confessions).
108. See id. ("It would be indeed surprising if the privilege against self-incrimination were
available to hardened criminals but not to children.') The issue in Gault was simply whether or
not Miranda applied to juveniles in custody who faced juvenile proceedings. See id. at 13-14. The
Court answered that Miranda did apply. See id. at 56-57.
109. Id. at 55 ("[S]pecial problems might arise with respect to waiver or the privilege by or on
behalf of children ... ").
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developed by police to handle waiver by juveniles, "depending on the
age of the child and the presence and competence of parents. ' .. In its
reasoning, the majority returned to the notion that the presence or
absence of parents in juvenile custodial interrogation should dictate,
in large part, police procedures.' The Court found that when parents
were absent and the juvenile had no legal counsel with him in the in-
terrogation room, "the greatest care must be taken to assure the ad-
mission was voluntary.""- Not only must police be sure the admission
was voluntary, but police must ensure that the admission actually has
some basis in fact and is not instead a case of the juvenile telling po-
lice what the juvenile thinks the police want to hear.'
C. The Limitation of Per Se Invocation Under Miranda:
Fare v. Michael C.
The Supreme Court again confronted the issue of juvenile
Miranda rights in Fare v. Michael C., twelve years after the Court's
decision in Gault."' The facts in Fare were similar to Haley"' and Gal-
legos; 8 a juvenile was arrested for murder and interrogated by police
without the presence of a parent or an attorney." The juvenile's con-
fession was later used to convict him."8 The juvenile in custody in Fare
was not physically abused, nor was he kept in custody for an extended
amount of time."9 When police brought Michael C. into custody after
informing him of his rights, he asked to see his probation officer." The
110. Id. (emphasis added).
111. See id. at 38 n.65 (describing President's Crime Commission report on which the Court
relied).
112. Id. at 55 (emphasis added).
113. See id. ("[The admission cannot be] the product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent
fantasy, fright or despair.").
114. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 723 (1979) (holding a juvenile's request for his proba-
tion officer did not constitute a per se invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights).
115. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 597-98 (1948).
116. Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 49-50 (1962).
117. See Fare, 442 U.S. at 710.
118. See id. at 711.
119. The Fare decision never discloses how long Michael C. was in police custody before he
confessed. See id. at 710-11. Given the importance the Court ascribed to the juvenile's length of
detention in other cases one can only assume the length of Michael C. custodial interrogation
was unremarkable.
120. See id. The actual exchange between the officer and the juvenile is instructive to the ju-
venile mindset while in police custody:
Q: Do you want to give up your right to have an attorney present while we talk about [the
crime]?
A: Can I have my probation officer here?
Q: Well I can't get a hold of your probation officer right now. You have the right to an at-
torney.
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police denied that request and Michael C. subsequently confessed to
the murder. 1 Michael C. later appealed the admissibility of his con-
fession in the juvenile proceedings, claiming that his request for his
probation officer was a per se invocation of his Fifth Amendment
rights under Miranda." The Court broke from its prior interpreta-
tions of juvenile constitutional rights in the interrogation setting and
narrowed juvenile Miranda rights by holding that Michael C.'s re-
quest was not a per se invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights."'
Under the terms of Miranda, a suspect's request for counsel during a
custodial interrogation would have the same constitutional force as a
more explicit invocation by the suspect of his right to remain silent.
Thus, a request for counsel became a per se invocation of the Fifth
Amendment. By holding that Michael C.'s request for his probation
officer was not a per se invocation of the Fifth Amendment-and since
he had not availed himself of his right to silence or specifically re-
quested legal counsel-the Court held that he had no grounds to re-
quest the suppression of his confession. 4
In its opinion, the Court first addressed whether a juvenile's
request for a probation officer would automatically afford him the
same protection that a request for counsel provided under Miranda.'
The Court found that a request for a probation officer was simply not
the same as a request for counsel. It reasoned that a lawyer has a dis-
tinct role in the judicial system and a corresponding duty to protect
his client.26 A probation officer, on the other hand, has neither.27
Rather, the duty of a probation officer is to prosecute offenders-a role
that puts him at odds with the fiduciary responsibilities of a lawyer.
A: How I know you guys won't pull no police officer in here and tell me he's an attorney?
Q: Huh?
Id.
121. See id. at 711-12.
122. See id. at 712. After losing in the California Court of Appeals, Michael C. won in the
California Supreme Court which held that Michael C.'s request for his probation officer did con-
stitute a per se invocation of his Miranda rights. See id. at 713-15.
123. See id. at 724.
124. See id.
125. See id. at 719 (discussing that a lawyer's societally recognized place in the judicial sys-
tem as the fiduciary advocate of her clients rights makes a request for a lawyer constitutionally
meaningful and powerful).
126. See id. ("[T]he lawyer occupies a critical position in our legal system because of his
unique ability to protect the Fifth Amendment rights of a client undergoing custodial interroga-
tion").
127. See id.
128. See id. at 720. The Court offered no discussion and no mention of the potential role that
a parent could play in this scenario. See id. at 719-22. Indeed, the Court mentions "parent" only
once and in passing. See id. at 725 (using the word "parent" in a fuller description of the totality
of the circumstances test).
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The Court was concerned that a holding that a juvenile's re-
quest for his probation officer is a per se invocation of his Fifth
Amendment rights would expand Miranda beyond its intended
scope." Such a holding, the Court feared, would lead to a potentially
unlimited list of people the juvenile could ask to consult." The Court
envisioned potential scenarios where a juvenile might ask for his foot-
ball coach, neighbor, school buddy, "clergyman or close friend. 13' Were
the Court to hold as the Respondent urged, reasoned the majority in
Fare, consulting any of these would constitute an invocation of a sus-
pect's Fifth Amendment rights and would end a custodial interroga-
tion.'32 This would likely end the usefulness of juvenile custodial inter-
rogations altogether.'3' Obviously, a parent is no substitute for an at-
torney and this Note does not advocate that a parent is. Instead, this
Note suggests that the question before the Fare court was a narrow
one-whether a request for a probation officer is constitutionally the
same as a request for a lawyer-and has limited applicability when
considering the role of a parent or guardian in juvenile custodial inter-
rogations. A parent's presence is not to provide the juvenile with legal
advice but could assure that a juvenile understood what was going on.
It could be an extra layer of protection for the juvenile's constitutional
rights that the Fare Court was not asked to contemplate and, as a re-
sult, did not.
Finally, the Fare Court employed the "totality of the circum-
stances" test. " The Court used this test to provide judges with more
flexibility in determining if a juvenile's confession was, in fact, volun-
tary."' The Court reasoned that this test would allow a juvenile court
to take into account any requests that the juvenile might have made,
whether it was to consult his parents, his probation officer, or another
party. 8
Fare was a constriction of juvenile Miranda rights when read
against Haley, Gallegos and Gault as well as the provisions of
129. See id. at 723 (describing the effect a new rule would have on Miranda).
130. See id. ("If it were otherwise, a juvenile's request for almost anyone he considered
trustworthy enough to give him reliable advice would trigger the rigid rule of Miranda.').
131. Id. at 722-23.
132. Id.
133. See'id. at 723.
134. Id. at 725-27 "[The totality of the circumstances test] includes evaluation of the juve-
nile's age, experience, education, background, and intelligence, and inquires into whether he has
the capacity to understand the warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights,
and the consequences of waiving those rights." Id.
135. See id.
136. See id. ("[T]he totality approach will allow the court the necessary flexibility to take this
into account in making a waiver determination.').
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Miranda applicable to all subjects of police interrogation. Yet the deci-
sion in Fare does not require that a juvenile not be allowed to consult
anyone other than legal counsel in order to accommodate the constitu-
tional guarantees provided for by Miranda and Gault."7 The crucial
problem with the totality of the circumstances test is that the test
mandates complicated psychological analysis to determine if a juvenile
waiver is voluntary when state courts were unable to perform such an
analysis."8 In fact, the rule enunciated in Fare is perhaps the least
effective way to bridge the gap in constitutional protections between
Fare, Miranda, and Gault.
III. THE STATES' RESPONSE
The vast majority of juvenile cases are disposed of in the juve-
nile systems of the states.'39 As such, the burden usually falls to the
state courts to interpret the Court's constitutional framework in the
area of juvenile custodial confessions in order to accommodate the
Miranda guarantees against compelled self-incrimination as well as
Fare's "totality of the circumstances" test.40 In applying the law from
both cases, the states have typically accorded more deference to one or
the other.4' For example, some states that emphasize the importance
of the Miranda guarantees have held that a juvenile cannot be inter-
137. Id. (describing a situation where a juvenile's request for his parents could actually serve
as an invocation of his right to remain silent).
138. For the varying state responses to this rule, see infra Part III. Most states have applied
the totality of the circumstances test in a way that allows virtually all juvenile confessions to be
admitted. Conversely, other states have completely abandoned the totality test in favor of a rule
that would bar juvenile confessions obtained without the presence of an interested adult. In
either case, the "flexible" test that the Fare Court thought it created has not been applied flexi-
bly.
139. Ninety-four percent of State court prosecutors offices had responsibility for handling all
juvenile cases. See CAROL J. DEFRANCES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, JUVENILES
PROSECUTED IN STATE CRIMINAL COURTS 1 (1997). The U.S. Department of Justice does not sys-
tematically collect information on juvenile transfers from the state criminal justice system to the
federal system. See id. In order for a juvenile to be transferred from the state system to the fed-
eral system, the U.S. Attorney must show at least one of the following: the state does not have
jurisdiction; the state refuses to assume jurisdiction; the state with jurisdiction "does not have
adequate programs or services for juvenile offenders"; or the offense charged is a violent felony,
drug offense or firearm offense. See id.
140. For a discussion of the responsibility of state systems in prosecuting juvenile offenders,
see infra notes 167-82 and accompanying text.
141. Compare In re E.T.C., 449 A.2d 937, 940 (Vt. 1982) (exemplifying a state placing a
higher value on broad Miranda guarantees), with Commonwealth v. Williams, 475 A.2d 1283,
1288 (Pa. 1984) (exemplifying a state adhering to the totality test).
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rogated in the absence of an "interested adult."'"2 At least one state has
adopted a totality of the circumstances test and applied it in such a
manner that requires a suspect to be effectively apprised of his rights
for any waiver to be voluntary in addition to accounting for the juve-
nile's circumstances to test his voluntariness." The vast majority of
states, however, have chosen to apply the Fare test to a juvenile con-
fession."" In doing so, some state courts have focused on the exact lan-
guage of Fare by taking unsophisticated measurements of the stated
factors in juvenile voluntariness. ' These courts engage in a limited
analysis of whether or not a juvenile understood his rights and chose
to waive them freely. These states do not necessarily apply the totality
test with flexibility, as the Fare Court hoped, but rather employ a
more formulaic style that neglects the focus of Miranda that ques-
tioned whether the suspect understood his rights during interrogation
and whether he waived them voluntarily.'48
A. The Rigidity of the "Totality" Test: Fare's Unintended Consequences
The totality of the circumstances analysis, as the Fare Court
constructed it, was intentionally vague.' The Court made the test
vague in order to give judges enough flexibility to make appropriate
judgments regarding the validity of juvenile waiver on a case-by-case
basis.'
48
142. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 449 N.E.2d 654, 657 (Mass. 1983) (holding that
in order for the state to prove that a juvenile voluntarily and knowingly waived his rights
against compelled self-incrimination, a parent or interested adult must be present); E.T.C., 449
A.2d at 940 (holding that a juvenile cannot waive his rights against compelled self-incrimination
without the presence of an interested adult).
143. See In re LaShun H., 672 N.E.2d 331, 335-36 (Il1. App. Ct. 1996) (holding that in the to-
tality of the circumstances the absence of a juvenile suspect's parents rendered the juvenile's
confession involuntary).
144. See Elizabeth J. Maykut, Who Is Advising Our Children: Custodial Interrogation of Ju-
veniles in Florida, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1345, 1364-68 (1994) (discussing the prevalence of the
totality test).
145. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979) ("[The totality of the circumstances test] in-
cludes evaluation of the juvenile's age, experience, education, background, and intelligence and
inquires into whether he has the capacity to understand the warnings given him, the nature of
his Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights.'); see also W.M. v.
Florida, 585 So.2d 979, 983 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that a ten year old's age was not a
bar to an intelligent waiver and that his background and intelligence gave him the ability to
waive his Fifth Amendment rights).
146. See, e.g., Arizona v. Scholtz, 791 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990); Michigan v. Gi-
vans, 575 N.W.2d 84, 89 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
147. Fare, 442 U.S. at 725-26 (discussing how the totality test is broadly written to allow for
flexibility)
148. See Fare, 442 U.S. at 725 ("Where the age and experience of a juvenile indicate that his
request for his probation officer or his parents is, in fact, an invocation of his right to remain
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Unfortunately, the flexible standard the Court envisioned has
not been borne out in state decisions subsequent to Fare.' As a prac-
tical matter, these states have held that, regardless of the circum-
stances, a juvenile's waiver is almost always voluntary and that his
confession is thus admissible."
One of the initial problems with applying the totality of the cir-
cumstances test has been the emergence of 'Jurisdictional justice."51
Case law illustrates that the totality test can yield different results for
similarly situated juveniles, which makes the admissibility of confes-
sions-and possibly the prospect of life imprisonment-turn on where
a juvenile committed the crime.152
A comparison of the Fare "checklist!' of factors with the over-
arching goals of Miranda illustrates the shortcomings of the totality
test as a means of guaranteeing juveniles their constitutional rights.
The Miranda Court held that a defendant must have the warnings
given and explained to him so that "there can be any assurance of real
understanding and intelligent exercise of the privilege."'' In adult
cases, like that of Miranda himself, the Court likely assumed that an
adult would understand the warnings and require only a brief expla-
nation. However the requirement that the defendant must understand
the warnings is explicit in Miranda, as the quoted portion above indi-
cates."'
Justice Marshall, in his dissent in Fare, wrote that Miranda
requires that an interrogation cease when a juvenile asks for an adult
"obligated to represent his interests."'55 Marshall wrote that the youth
of the defendant mandated that the Miranda Court's "prophylactic
silent, the totality approach will allow the court the necessary flexibility to take this into account
in making a waiver determination.).
149. See W.M., 585 So. 2d at 985 (Farmer, J., dissenting) (discussing how the Florida court
engaged in a rigid application of the totality test).
150. See, e.g., Michigan v. Givans, 575 N.W.2d 84, 88-89 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997); Minnesota v.
Critt, 554 N.W.2d 93, 96 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996); In re R.M., 880 S.W.2d 297, 299 (Tx. Ct. App.
1994).
151. Compare In re Lashun H., 672 N.E.2d 331, 335-36 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (holding that in
the totality of the circumstances a juvenile's waiver was involuntary), with In re J.E. & V.B., 675
N.E.2d 156, 163-64 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (holding that a juvenile's waiver was voluntary). This
Note is not suggesting that this problem is endemic to juvenile custodial interrogations. Rather,
it is a theoretical problem with a real life example in the above cited cases. While the juvenile
defendants were not in the exact same circumstances (one defendant was fourteen, the other
sixteen) the cases are very similar but with different results. These two cases only raise this
issue as a potential unintended problem of Fare rather than prove its existence.
152. See supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
153. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966) (emphasis added).
154. Id. (explaining that understanding of the warnings is required).
155. Fare v, Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 729 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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requirements"-the warnings themselves and that a request for coun-
sel was a per se invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege-be con-
strued broadly to accomplish their "intended purpose" of dispelling the
inherent compulsion of police questioning."
The Fare majority, however, described an imprecise test for de-
termining if a juvenile fully understands his Fifth Amendment rights
and the consequences of waiving those rights.5 ' It calls for judges to
examine juvenile "intelligence" and a juvenile's "capacity to under-
stand."'58 In light of these problematic tests, state courts have often
applied them inflexibly. The reason why state courts have applied the
Fare test so rigidly is speculative at best. One reason could be that
this area calls for a bright line test on the voluntariness of a juvenile's
confession because it is too difficult for the bench to adequately probe
juvenile understanding and intelligence. When the state court has
been given no bright line test, it has essentially turned the vague to-
tality test into a presumption of admissibility for juvenile confessions.
The inflexibility of the Fare test as applied by state courts is
evident in some of the more egregious cases where a court evaluating
the "totality of the circumstances" found a "voluntary waiver" on the
part of the juvenile. In Minnesota v. Jones, the defendant offered ex-
pert testimony that his IQ placed him in the mental retardation
range, and that he was "extremely susceptible to domination by per-
sons whom he perceive[d] to be in positions of authority."55 The court
was not persuaded and found Jones' waiver to be voluntary."
In Miller v. Arkansas the court considered the waiver of a thir-
teen year old who was not told during his custodial interrogation that
he had a right to speak to his parents-despite the fact that Arkansas
law provided him that right.'6' Despite these facts, the court found that
"the totality of the circumstances" indicated that the juvenile had vol-
untarily waived his Miranda rights." Thus the court upheld the juve-
nile's felony murder conviction."
156. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 725-27.
158. Id. at 725.
159. Minnesota v. Jones, 566 N.W.2d 317, 325 (Minn. 1979).
160. See id. The prosecution offered their own expert testimony that Jones' intellect did not
interfere with his ability to make decisions-yet the court did not state whether the experts had
testified that Jones understood what he was doing when he made his statements. See id.
161. Miller v. Arkansas, 994 S.W.2d 476, 478 (Ark. 1999). The court held that though Miller
had a right to speak to his parents, the police had no obligation to inform him of that right be-
cause the statute had not mandated it. See id. at 479.
162. Id. at 480.
163. See id. Other cases illustrate the same problem in the application of Fare. In Alabama v.
Banks, 734 So. 2d 371, 371 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999), a juvenile received adult Miranda warnings
instead of juvenile Miranda warnings. This occurred even though Alabama law requires that a
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The dissenting judge in W.M. v. Florida, a case where a ten
year old was found to have voluntarily waived his Miranda rights,
noted that the "totality of the circumstances" test was so inflexible it
had become a misnomer." The judge said that "not a single objective
factor" in the juvenile's case even suggested that the juvenile's confes-
sion to police was voluntary." The judge concluded that the test ap-
plied by the Florida court in the juvenile's case "seemed to... be the
very antithesis of the 'totality-of-the-circumstances.' "s
B. Providing an "Interested Adult"- The Minority Position
Shortly after Fare was decided, state juvenile courts confronted
the problems inherent in juvenile custodial interrogations. This time,
however, they had a test offered by the Supreme Court that was in-
tended to let them take into account all relevant circumstances.1 ' De-
spite the Fare test, a number of state courts created different proce-
dures that rested on state grounds. 1  These procedures would allow
juvenile custodial interrogations to take place, but would at the same
time address the potential for juvenile confessions resulting solely
from intimidation. The state courts did this by holding on independ-
ent, state constitutional grounds that juvenile confessions would be
considered involuntary if made in the absence of a parent or
guardian. 9
juvenile be apprised of his right to speak to his parent before making a statement. See id. at 371.
The Alabama court decided the case by holding that while Banks was a juvenile when arrested
and given his Miranda rights, he was eventually charged as an adult and thus, in the totality of
the circumstances, his waiver was voluntary. See id. at 373. Juvenile Miranda warnings are
warnings that some states have adopted to help juveniles understand them; they use smaller
words, more simplistic phraseology and other devices to make the warnings more suitable to
children. See W.M. v. Florida, 585 So. 2d 979, 983 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that a ten-
year-old with a learning disability was, in the totality of the circumstances, capable of voluntar-
ily waiving his Fifth Amendment rights and finding his confession voluntary).
164. Id. at 985 (Farmer, J., dissenting).
165. Id. (Farmer, J., dissenting).
166. Id. (Farmer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
167. See Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979) (describing the totality of the circum-
stances test).
168. See, e.g., Colorado v. Salazar, 541 P.2d 676, 681 (Col. 1975) (describing a Colorado stat-
ute that presumes a juvenile confession is involuntary when made in the absence of a parent or
guardian); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2101(b) (1999) (barring the admissibility of a juvenile
confession obtained without the presence of the juvenile's parent or guardian).
169. See, e.g., In re E.T.C., Juvenile, 449 A.2d 937, 939 (Vt. 1982) (describing the state con-
stitutional grounds for the holding).
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The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts first adopted the
"interested adult' rule in Commonwealth v. A Juvenile.7 ' The Massa-
chusetts high court first noted that there was a distinct need for cau-
tion in evaluating juvenile confessions to prevent juveniles from con-
fessing out of "fantasy, fright or despair.'.'. The court suggested that
studies of juvenile waiver supported the idea that juveniles were un-
able to clearly understand the gravity of a custodial interrogation (and
the potential consequences of that interrogation) even after given no-
tice of their rights.'72 In order to make up for this deficiency of under-
standing on the part of the juvenile, the court concluded that the only
way for the state to prove that a juvenile had made a knowing and
valid waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights was to show that an "in-
terested adult was present, understood the warnings, and had the op-
portunity to explain those warnings and Fifth Amendment rights to
the juvenile.'7 . The court noted that the procedure reflected an as-
sumption that "an informed parent, or person standing in loco paren-
tis" would be able to assist the child in understanding rights that the
juvenile would be unable to understand on his own.'"
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Vermont recognized that mi-
nors held both a subordinate and a protected status in society with
legally recognized differences from adults. 5 Based on these assump-
tions, the court found that juveniles are unable to understand their
rights against compelled self-incrimination unless an "interested
adult" is allowed to consult with the child during a custodial interro-
gation."6 As a result, the Vermont high court held that for a juvenile's
waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights to be valid, an interested adult
must be provided to the juvenile, informed of the juvenile's rights and
given an opportunity to consult with the juvenile."'
Other states have also adopted statutes which bar a juvenile's
confession from being admissible in court unless an adult is present
with the juvenile during questioning."8 In North Carolina, a juvenile
170. Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 449 N.E.2d 654, 657-58 (Mass. 1983) (holding that a ju-
venile could not be questioned outside the presence of an "interested adult").
171. Id. at 656 (quoting Gallegos v. Colorado, 387 U.S. 49, 54 (1962)).
172. See id. (noting that studies suggested that most juveniles do not understand the signifi-
cance and protective function bf these rights even when they are read the Miranda warnings).
173. Id. at 657.
174. Id.
175. See In re E.T.C., 449 A.2d 937, 939 (Vt. 1982).
176. See id.
177. See id. at 940.
178. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 3204 (West 1999) (barring admissibility of a ju-
venile's confession if obtained in the absence of a paient or guardian); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
19-2-511(1) (West 1997) (barring admissibility of a juvenile's confession if obtained in the ab-
sence of a parent or guardian).
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under the age of fourteen cannot be interrogated in the absence of his
parent or guardian.1' Nor can a juvenile waive his Fifth Amendment
rights without consulting that person."
These states that have held that juveniles are likely incapable
of making a knowing or voluntary waiver of their Fifth Amendment
rights are in the minority."' Admittedly, the "interested adult" stan-
dard has problems. The test does not adequately address who is le-
gaily "interested" in the rights and welfare of a juvenile. Nor does the
test address the Fare Court's concerns that a juvenile could consult an
unlimited number of people as a per se invocation of his Fifth
Amendment rights. '82 Although the "interested adult" test is not per-
fect, it is at least an attempt to protect juveniles from the threat of
having confessions coerced out of them.
In summary, neither the "interested adult" test nor the "total-
ity of the circumstances" test adequately address the need for effective
police investigation and the effective protection of juvenile constitu-
tional rights. In an attempt to bridge the gap between them, this Note
proposes that a bright line rule be created to allow a juvenile access to
a parent or guardian during questioning about a serious crime.
IV. PROPOSAL
More and more juveniles are being prosecuted for serious
crimes." As more and more juveniles are processed through the adult
criminal system and pressure to speed the process along increases
with that increase in volume, it stands to reason that the temptation
179. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2101(b) (1999).
180. See id. Similarly, Colorado bars the admissibility of juvenile custodial statements made
without the presence of a parent or guardian but only allows the admissibility of such statements
if certain circumstances are present that tend to show a juvenile's contact with a parent would be
unhelpful to the juvenile. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-2-511.
181. See Maykut, supra note 144, at 1364-68 (describing the limited number of states that
have such a rule).
182. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979) (describing unlimited list of people who a
juvenile may invoke).
183. In 1997, law enforcement agencies made an estimated 2.8 million arrests of persons un-
der the age of 18. See Howard Synder, Estimated Number of Juvenile Arrests, 1997, OJJDP
STATISTICAL BRIEFING BOOK (visited Jan. 6, 2000) <http://ojjdp.ncjrs.orgojstabb/qaOO.html>. Of
those arrests, over 123,000 were for murder, non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery
or aggravated assault. See id. Of all the juvenile arrests for violent crimes, an estimated 30% of
those juveniles arrested were under the age of fifteen. See id. In the nation's seventy-five largest
counties, 66% of the juveniles transferred to criminal court were violent felony offenders. See
KEVIN J. STROM, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, JUVENILE FELONY DEFENDANTS IN CRIMINAL
COURTS 2 (1998).
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to coerce confessions would increase. It is against this background
that the following proposal is offered.
The challenge in offering a new model for the protection of a
juvenile's Fifth Amendment rights in the context of custodial interro-
gations lies in addressing two major concerns."M The first concern is
that the system must adequately protect the rights of the juveniles in
custody because of the danger of coerced confessions." The second
concern is that police must be free to investigate criminal activity and
not be "handcuffed" by an overbroad application of Miranda and
Gault."
The basic premise of this Note is that juvenile custodial inter-
rogation procedures should reflect the mandate the Court set out in
Miranda and later applied to children through Gault. Courts must
take great care to see that the accused juvenile is "adequately and ef-
fectively apprised of his rights.''.. This includes a necessary recogni-
tion that juveniles, particularly younger juveniles, have trouble solv-
ing basic analytical problems with regard to complicated concepts such
as "rights," "waiver" and "consequences."'" Childlike impulses or lack
of experience are often cited as leading a child to make an illogical
choice based on extraneous factors." For example, juveniles cannot be
expected to logically decide whether to speak to police because their
cognitive development is not at the level of adults." Two psychologists
have suggested that some cognitive lessons are learned only with in-
creasing age, and it is a mistake to hold children to an average adult
standard of cognition."' When faced with a coercive environment or
184. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 439 (1966) (discussing the balance between up-
holding the federal constitution and prosecuting criminals).
185. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967) (holding that juveniles enjoy the same constitu-
tional protections as adults against coerced confessions).
186. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 439 (describing the societal need to prosecute criminals).
187. Id. at 467.
188. See, e.g., WOOD, supra note 97, at 199 ("Children may fail to solve problems which entail
drawing inferences because they are too impulsive and accept the first model that comes to mind
as the only possibility. They may also lack effective resources and/or strategies for memorizing
the results of their model-making... children are also able to process less information simulta-
neously than adults ...
189. See id.
190. See id. at 200 ("If, however, children are more limited than adults in how much informa-
tion they can process, either because their speed of mental processing is slower (Chase) or be-
cause they have more restricted processing capability (Halford), then we should not expect them
to solve logical problems.., because they do not possess the mental resources to build models
which incorporate all the necessary relations."). Chase and Halford are other eminent child psy-
chologists with theories on the speed of adolescent mental processes and the limits of child proc-
essing capability, respectively. See id.
191. See Mal Leicester & Richard Pierce, Cognitive Development, Self Knowledge and Moral
Education, 26 J. MORAL EDUC. 455 (1997).
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show of authority, a child is more willing to do what it appears the
authority figure would have them do.'92 Taken together, these studies
indicate that a child, unaccompanied by an adult advisor or a parent,
would not only have serious trouble understanding the warnings as
given, but might not be in a position to indicate to police that he does
have such trouble.'93 Simply put, a juvenile might say he understands
a warning out of fear or out of a desire to please. Thus, in order for a
juvenile to be effectively apprised of his rights as required by
Miranda, the child needs more than simply a warning by police offi-
cers.
A second role that a parent or guardian could play in this con-
text is that of an emotional counselor or trustworthy advisor."' This
would not totally conflict with the Court's concerns in Fare; a parent is
quite unlike a probation officer in that society looks to the parent to
protect the child in his dealings with the world.9 5 Fare does not spe-
cifically address how the ruling would have been affected had Mi-
chael C. requested his parent instead of his probation officer. The
proposition that the Fare Court used to distinguish a request for coun-
sel from a request for a probation officer-that the attorney is the per-
son to whom society looks as the protector of his client ---is easily
transmutable to the idea that a parent is the one person to whom soci-
ety looks as the protector of his child.197 It follows that the limitation of
the class of people whom the juvenile could request to consult that
would serve as a per se invocation of their Fifth Amendment rights to
the juvenile's parent, guardian or counsel, would counter the Fare
Court's concerns without resort the rigidity of the totality test.
The totality test was designed to give greater latitude to police
and court officers in making determinations about the voluntariness of
a child's waiver, but an unfortunate side effect is that those officers
192. See Stephen J. Blumberg & David H. Silvera, Attributional Complexity and Cognitive
Development: A Look at the Motivational and Cognitive Requirements for Attribution, 16 SOC.
COGNITION 253, 263-65 (1997) (outlining the idea that children often have a "need for closure"
and are more prone to being pressured to make a decision).
193. See supra notes 172-77 and accompanying text.
194. The Court disregarded the juvenile's earlier statement: "How I know you won't pull no
police officer in and tell me he's an attorney?" Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 711 (1979). The
juvenile was seeking a real fiduciary, someone he knew and trusted-in his mind a lawyer was
neither. See id.
195. The Fare Court used a similar description in outlining a lawyer's role: "the lawyer is the
one person to whom society as a whole looks as the protector of the legal rights of that person in
his dealings with the police and the courts." Id. at 719.
196. Id.
197. See Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 600 (1948) (describing John Haley's mother as his
"closest friend" and someone he needed in time of trouble).
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are often unprepared to make such complicated evaluations.'98 Most
police officers do not have advanced clinical psychological training and
generally have no relationship with the juvenile aspect. As such, an
average police officer is likely unprepared to make complicated psy-
chological evaluations.
Requiring the presence of a parent, guardian or legal counsel
during a juvenile custodial interrogation is an approach that could
solve a number of the problems outlined in this Note. It could remedy
the problems encountered by states and allow police officers and
courts to tailor their behavior to the Constitution. '99 It would both ade-
quately protect juvenile's constitutional rights but still allow police to
utilize current interrogation procedures to investigate crime and ap-
prehend the criminal.'
The procedure would work as follows.2"' Once a juvenile is in
police custody on suspicion of a felony, he should be read his Miranda
warnings as required by Gault and Miranda." Then the police should
inform the child that he has the right to have a parent or guardian
with him during questioning. 3 Police would then ask the juvenile the
names and phone numbers of his parents or guardian and ascertain
how the parent or guardian of the child could be reached." The police
officer would then have to take reasonable steps to contact the juve-
nile's parents or guardian to notify them of the juvenile's arrest and
what the juvenile's rights are. Exactly what constitutes "reasonable
steps" could be a point of some contention. A good faith effort would
include calling the phone numbers the juvenile gave or taking other
moderate effort to contact a parent such as consulting the phone book
or calling two alternate locations where the parent might be (i.e. the
parent's workplace or cellular phone number). If a juvenile simply re-
198. See Fare, 442 U.S. at 725 (describing the flexibility of the totality test).
199. See id. at 729 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (describing how Miranda mandates that an in-
terrogation cease when a child asks for a parent or guardian).
200. See id. at 734 (Powell, J., dissenting) (describing the ease with which police could have
taken measures to assist Michael C. in his interrogation).
201. This Note addresses the procedure under the assumption that the parent is able to be
present. Although there will be numerous circumstances where a parent will not be able to be
present, they are beyond the scope of this Note.
202. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14 (1967) ("[N]either the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of
Rights is for adults alone.').
203. A number of states already feature this warning as a part of their "juvenile Miranda"
statutes and procedures. See, e.g., ALA. R. JUV. P. 11(B)(4) (stipulating that Alabama juveniles
have a right to communicate with a parent or guardian before making a statement).
204. A number of states as well as the federal government already require law enforcement
to notify a juvenile's parents if the juvenile is arrested. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 5033 (1999) (re-
quiring the police to notify a parent or guardian on the arrest of the juvenile as a part of the
Juvenile Delinquency Act).
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fuses to give police the name of a parent, an attorney would be pro-
vided to the juvenile to assure his statements to police were voluntary.
If the juvenile blurts out a confession to police after receiving
Miranda warnings but before a parent or guardian arrives, the Fare
totality test would still be applicable. As imprecise as the test may be
in a spontaneous confession situation, where the extra protection of an
adult presence failed, it would still be valuable precedent.
The police officer would be bound only to contact the juvenile's
parent or legal guardian. The legal guardian could include a step-
parent or grandparent if that person has taken the juvenile into their
home and provided for their welfare as required by law. The police
officer would not be bound to contact the juvenile's priest, teacher,
friend, relative or anyone else the juvenile requested. This provision is
necessary to address the concern in Fare that there not be an unlim-
ited list of people whom the juvenile could consult which would serve
as a per se invocation of the juvenile's Fifth Amendment rights.'
Once contact with the juvenile's parent or guardian is estab-
lished and the basic information imparted, the police officer would
then request that the parent or guardian come to the police station to
be present with the juvenile during interrogation.
Until the parent or guardian arrives, the police would be for-
bidden to ask the juvenile any questions regarding the alleged crime.
It would be a situation constitutionally similar to that of an adult de-
fendant who has asserted his right to counsel under the Fifth
Amendment-all police interrogation would cease.' Any information
elicited from the juvenile by the police before a parent or guardian was
present would be inadmissible at trial as violative of the Fifth
Amendment. 7
Upon the arrival of the parent or guardian, the police would
verify that both the child and parent understood the Miranda rights
as had been read to them. This might take the form of a written ac-
knowledgement that the juvenile had been read his rights and under-
205. Fare, 442 U.S. at 723 ('The State cannot transmute the relationship between the proba-
tion officer and juvenile offender into the type of relationship between attorney and client that
was essential to the holding of Miranda .... If it did, the State could expand the class of persons
covered by the Miranda per se rule simply by creating a duty to care for the juvenile on the part
of other persons, regardless of whether the logic of Miranda would justify that extension.').
206. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404-05 (1977) (holding that statements made to
police after a defendant has invoked his right to counsel are inadmissible at trial). Obviously
Brewer deals with a defendant who has invoked his right to counsel. This Note does not suggest
that a request for a parent is analogous to a request for counsel. Rather, for the purposes of this
proposal, the inadmissibility of a juvenile's statement made outside the presence of a parent
would be similar to the inadmissibility of the defendant's statement in Brewer.
207. See id.
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stood them. Key to this aspect of the procedure is that the parent must
verify to the police that the child understands the Miranda warnings.
This has the benefit of removing from doubt the issue of whether a
child understands the warnings from the hands of police and court
officers. It would no longer be necessary to rely on police testimony or
psychological evaluations of the child post-interrogation. In states that
use a Miranda waiver form ',a parent or guardian could simply coun-
tersign the child's form verifying that the juvenile understands the
warnings. Once this verification has been made, the police may com-
mence an interrogation. Of course, at any time the child may assert
his right to silence or to counsel.' If the child decides to talk to the
police, the parent must ascertain that the child is doing so voluntarily
and inform police that the child is speaking of his own free will. 1' Once
this has occurred, the police may freely interrogate the child and any
statements the juvenile makes can be used against him at trial.
Statements the juvenile makes within this framework have the ad-
vantage of near unquestioned reliability-a defense lawyer would be
hard pressed to argue his client was coerced if his client's parent was
sitting next to the juvenile during the interrogation. Police officers
would also be able to conduct an interrogation without fear of having a
confession suppressed at trial. Both of these advantages were cited by
the Fare Court as advantages of the holding in Miranda."' This model
assures that juvenile custodial interrogations receive the same advan-
tages.
Yet the greatest advantage is that a court's application of the
totality of the circumstances test would be far simpler. In addition to
measuring a juvenile's voluntariness at the time of the interrogation
208. Several states now use an actual Miranda waiver form where the defendant stipulates
that they have been read and understand their rights and wish to waive them to speak to police.
See Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195 (1989) (discussing Miranda waiver forms).
209. One thing this model would not change is that the juvenile himself would still be re-
quired to assert his own rights. That is, a parent could not invoke the juvenile's right to silence
or counsel. The parent's presence is for the purpose of making sure that the child understands
those rights are available and making the child feel comfortable in asserting those rights-not to
assert the rights on behalf of the child. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966) ('The
warning of the right to remain silent must be accompanied by the explanation [of the right] ...
It is only through an awareness of these consequences that there can be any assurance of real
understanding and intelligent exercise of the privilege).
210. This confronts the Court's skepticism of a juvenile's ability to confess voluntarily in the
setting of a custodial interrogation. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 53-54 (1967) (finding that juve-
nile confessions are often unreliable and untrustworthy because they are products of a coercive
environment).
211. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 718 (1979) (stating that Miranda's holding had the
"virtue of informing police and prosecutors with specificity as to what they may do in conducting
custodial interrogation, and of informing courts under what circumstances statements obtained
during such interrogation are not admissible.'.
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through police reports, officer testimony or psychological evaluations,
the court would also have evidence that the juvenile's parent thought
the child was speaking to police voluntarily. A parental verification
made at the time of the questioning would serve to indicate that the
juvenile's statements were voluntary. A court would make judgments
it is prepared to make-on issues of police misconduct or constitu-
tional improprieties-rather than being forced to make judgments
more appropriate for a child psychologist or juvenile specialist.
V. CONCLUSION
On January 13, 2000 Nathaniel Abraham was sentenced to
serve in a juvenile institution until the age of eighteen, when he can
be evaluated again.1' Looking at the most recent juvenile statistics, it
seems likely that cases like that of Nathaniel Abraham will work their
way though the appellate court system, and this kind of issue could
potentially reach the Supreme Court. The issue of juvenile waiver of
the Fifth Amendment in custodial interrogations is increasingly rele-
vant. Every day more and more juveniles are being convicted of brutal
and terrible crimes.1 3
The juvenile custodial interrogation model advocated by this
Note is an attempt to bridge the gap between the broad constitutional
guarantees in Miranda and the practical limitations required in Fare.
It attempts to accommodate a need for adequate constitutional protec-
tion of juveniles as well as the need for aggressive police investigation
and prosecution of crime. If this proposal errs, it errs on the side of
more constitutional protection for juveniles rather than less. The pro-
cedures described here could either be adopted by a legislature in the
form of a statute or rule of procedure or adopted by a court as a com-
mon law measure.
212. See Michigan Judge Sentences Boy Killer to Juvenile Detention, (last checked March 14,
2000) <http://www.cnn.com/2000/US/01/13/abraham.sentencing.03/CNN.com>. Under the sen-
tence imposed by Judge Moore, a court will review Nathaniel's case when he turns eighteen. See
id. On the basis of these evaluations, he will serve time in an adult correctional facility, be placed
on probation, or possibly even be released completely. See id.
213. See, e.g., Peter Slevin & William Claiborne, 1st-Grader Shoots Classmate to Death,
WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 2000, at Al.
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As a society, we must not rush to convict these juveniles. To do
so would be to sacrifice constitutional rights for the sake of expedi-
ency. Instead, we must pay special attention to the needs of juveniles
in the justice system. America's children deserve nothing less.
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